Production of Body Knowledge in Mimetic Processes by Wulf, Christoph
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell'estetico 10 (1): 7-20, 2017
Firenze University Press 
www.fupress.com/aisthesisAisthesis
ISSN 2035-8466 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/Aisthesis-20900
Citation: C. Wulf (2017) Production of 
Body Knowledge in Mimetic Process-
es. Aisthesis 1(1): 7-20. doi: 10.13128/
Aisthesis-20900
Received: December 15, 2016
Accepted: April 15, 2017
Published: July 11, 2017
Copyright: © 2017 C. Wulf.This is an 
open access, peer-reviewed article 
published by Firenze University Press 
(http://www.fupress.com/aisthesis) and 
distribuited under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution License, 
which permits unrestricted use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in any medi-
um, provided the original author and 
source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All rel-
evant data are within the paper and its 
Supporting Information files.
Competing Interests: The authors 
have declared that no competing inter-
ests exist.





Abstract. To a great extent, cultural learning is mimetic learning, which is at the center 
of many processes of education, self-education, and human development. It is directed 
towards other people, social communities and cultural heritages and ensures that they 
are kept alive. Mimetic learning is a sensory, body-based form of learning in which 
images, schemas and movements needed to perform actions are learned. This embodi-
ment is responsible for the lasting effects that play an important role in all social and 
cultural fields. A mimetic process creates both similarities and differences to the situ-
ations or persons to which or whom they relate. By participating in the living prac-
tices of other people, humans expand their own life-worlds and create for themselves 
new ways of experiencing and acting. Receptivity and activity overlap. In all areas of 
human existence rituals and gestures are important for the mimetic development of 
body knowledge. Embodied knowledge is indispensable in religion, politics, economy, 
science, families, and education. It helps us to deal with difference and alterity and to 
create a sense of community and social relationships (Wulf 2016). It also enables us 
to assign meaning and structure to human relations. Ritual knowledge facilitates both 
continuity and change, as well as experiences of transition and transcendence.  
Key words. Body knowledge, mimesis, violence, mimetic learning, practical knowledge.
1. CULTURAL LEARNING AS MIMETIC LEARNING
Infants and small children relate to the people with whom they 
live: parents, elder siblings, other relatives and acquaintances. They 
try to be like them, by, for example answering a smile with a smile. 
However, they also initiate responses in adults by using skills they 
have already acquired (Dornes [1993]; Stern [2003]). These exchanges 
also enable small children to learn feelings. They learn to evoke their 
own feelings towards other people and to elicit them in others. The 
brain develops in the course of its exchanges with the environment, 
i.e. certain capacities are trained, others, on the other hand, fade 
(Rizzolatti, Sinigaglia [2008]; Fuchs [2008]). The cultural conditions 
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of early life are imprinted in the brains and bodies 
of small children. Anyone who has not learned to 
see, hear or speak at an early age has tremendous 
difficulties to acquire these skills at a later age. Ini-
tially, the mimetic actions of infants and children 
do not allow for a separation of subject and object; 
this occurs only at a later stage of development. At 
first, the world is perceived as magical, i.e. not only 
humans, but also objects are experienced as being 
alive. As rationality becomes more developed the 
capacity to experience the world in this way gradu-
ally becomes less central. However it is this capac-
ity upon which children draw to transform the 
external world into images in mimetic processes 
and to incorporate them into their internal image 
worlds (Gebauer, Wulf [1995]).
In his autobiography, “Berlin Childhood 
around 1900”, Walter Benjamin (2006) illustrated 
how children incorporate their cultural environ-
ments in processes of assimilation. In the course 
of these processes, children assimilate aspects of 
the parental home, such as the rooms, particular 
corners, objects and atmospheres. They are incor-
porated as “imprints” of the images and stored 
in the child’s imaginary world, where they are 
subsequently transformed into new images and 
memories that help the child gain access to other 
cultural worlds. Culture is handed on by means 
of these processes of incorporating and making 
sense of cultural products. The mimetic ability to 
transform the external material world into imag-
es, transferring them into our internal worlds of 
images and making them accessible to others ena-
bles individuals to actively shape cultural realities 
(Gebauer, Wulf [1995], [1998]; Wulf [1997]).
These processes encompass not only our modes 
of dealing with the material products of culture; 
but also social relationships and forms of activity 
and the way social life is staged and performed. In 
particular it involves forms of practical knowledge 
that are learned mimetically in body-oriented, sen-
sory processes and enable us to act competently in 
institutions and organizations (Wulf 2006b). Ritual 
knowledge is an important area of this practical 
social knowledge, and this is the means by which 
institutions become rooted in the human body, 
enabling us to orient ourselves in social situations. 
Images, schemas and movements are learned in 
mimetic processes, and these render the individual 
capable of action. Since mimetic processes involve 
products of history and culture, scenes, arrange-
ments and performances, these processes are 
among the most important ways of handing down 
culture from one generation to the next (Wulf 
[2014]; Dornhof, Graeff, Keltin [2016]). Without 
our mimetic abilities, cultural learning and “dou-
ble inheritance”, i.e. the handing down of cultural 
products along with biological inheritance, which 
enables culture to change and develop, would not 
be possible (Tomasello [1999]).
Writings – an assemblage of non-sensory 
similarities – elicits mimetic processes that help 
to bring to life what is read (Benjamin [1980a], 
[1980b]). It is the same with other products of cul-
ture that also require a mimetic relationship for 
them to come alive. Without such a relationship, 
they represent simply a cultural possibility that 
can only realize its full potential through processes 
of education and self-education. Such processes 
are particularly important in the transfer of cul-
ture from one generation to the next, since these 
processes require a metamorphosis to keep forms 
of living, knowledge, art or technology alive. As 
mimetic processes are not simply methods of cop-
ying worlds that have already been symbolically 
interpreted but also consist in our taking and then 
incorporating “impressions” of these worlds, these 
mimetic relationships always contain creative 
aspects which alter the original worlds. This cre-
ates a cultural dynamism between generations and 
cultures which constantly gives rise to new things.
To a great extent, cultural learning is mimetic 
learning, which is at the center of many process-
es of education and self-education. It is directed 
towards other people, social communities and cul-
tural heritages and ensures that they are kept alive. 
Mimetic learning is a sensory, body-based form 
of learning in which images, schemas and move-
ments needed to perform actions are learned. This 
embodiment is this that is responsible for the last-
ing effects that play an important role in all areas 
of cultural development. “Becoming similar” to 
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the world in mimetic actions becomes an oppor-
tunity to leave egocentrism, logocentrism and eth-
nocentrism behind and to open oneself to experi-
ences of otherness (Wulf [2006a], [2016]).
However, mimetic processes are also linked to 
aspirations to forms and experiences of higher lev-
els of life, in which vital experiences can be sought 
and found. As the experience of love, mimetic 
movements invoke “the power to see similarity in 
the dissimilar” (Adorno [1978]: 191). No knowl-
edge is possible without the production of simi-
larities, without mimesis. It is certainly taken as 
true for scientific knowledge that mimesis is indis-
pensable in the process of knowing. “Cognition 
itself cannot be conceived without the supplement 
of mimesis, however that may be sublimated. 
Without mimesis, the break between subject and 
object would be absolute and cognition impos-
sible” (Adorno [1982]: 143). If a mimetic element 
is indispensable in scientific knowledge, it is at 
the heart of aesthetic experience. Mimesis makes 
it possible to comprehend the self-equivalency 
of the artwork and occasion a knowledge from 
within, which exists independently of theories and 
concepts. Aesthetic experience arouses” a sense 
of being overwhelmed in the presence of a phe-
nomenon that is nonconceptual while at the same 
time being determinate” (Adorno [1984]: 236), 
and this sense is largely beyond the reach of plan-
ning and resists precise localization. In the sud-
den density of a moment there occurs an aesthetic 
shock, which can rock the foundation of the I. The 
mimetic impulse leads to momentary contact with 
what is nondeterminate in the similar-to-itself 
artwork. The works’s similarity is not referred 
to something outside itself, which is why mime-
sis in this context cannot denote the imitation of 
something that preexisted the work; rather, mime-
sis is similar to the self-referential creative force 
of the natura naturans, the nonobjective aspect 
of nature. Aesthetic experience arises in the “fine 
distance” between recipient and artwork and rep-
resents a nonscientific form of knowledge. “The 
continued existence of mimesis, understood as the 
non-conceptual affinity of subjective creation with 
its objective and unposited other, defines art as a 
form of cognition and to that extent as ‘rational’…
Art expands cognition into an area where it was 
said to be non-existent” (Adorno [1984]: 80). Art 
is a refuge for mimetic behavior” (Adorno [1984]: 
79), “the organ of mimesis” (Adorno [1984]:162). 
Aesthetic experience refers mimetic movement 
beyond works of art and beyond the subject to 
possibilities of historical development. It can 
thereby become the carrier of hopes, expectations, 
and promises. Its central concern is a nonfunc-
tionalized, improved relation between rationality 
and sensuousness.
In contrast to their role in aesthetic experience 
mimetic processes can also be connected with the 
processes whereby we are infected by experiences 
in which our subjectivity dissolves into chaos and 
uncontrolled violence. These processes also involve 
confrontations with power, domination, violence 
and oppression, which are part of every culture 
and into which the mimetic processes are repeat-
edly immersed. The vicious circle of violence is an 
example of the mimetic structure of many forms of 
violence (Girard [1977], [1987]). The starting point 
of this theory of violence is the insight that there 
lies in mimesis a necessity inextricably connected 
with being human, a reason for the emergence of 
violence among humans. Mimetic appropriation 
of attitudes and behaviors creates competition and 
rivalry, which then become the starting of acts of 
violence. Violent behavior especially is imitated. In 
most societies every act of violence is followed by 
a retaliatory act of violence, an occurrence which 
threatened the cohesion of the society. Two strat-
egies present themselves as methods of mastering 
the potential for violence emerging from mimesis: 
prohibition and ritual. By means of prohibitions 
everything which threatens the sense of commu-
nity is supposed to be excluded. This includes con-
flicts of competition, rivalry and violence, to all of 
which mimesis gives rise. Mimetic behavior which 
aims at eliminating differences which are essential 
to the structural maintenance of the internal order 
of a society, such as those behaviors necessitated by 
hierarchies and the division of functions, is forbid-
den. These essential types of behavior must be pre-
served because they fulfill an integrative function 
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and the society would be threatened if unlimited 
mimesis were allowed. It is necessary to restrain 
mimesis with prohibitions in order to strike a bal-
ance between its powers of social cohesion and 
social dissolution. While prohibitions strive to 
suppress violence that threatens the cohesion of 
a society by excluding the mimetic rivalry which 
contains the potential for such violence, rituals 
represent the attempt so channel manifest mimetic 
crises in such a manner that integration within the 
society is not endangered. When prohibitions are 
violated, a mimetic crisis that jeopardizes the social 
consensus as a result of a vicious circle of recipro-
cal violence arises. It is the task of rituals to master 
the danger to the cohesion of a society in mimetic 
conflict by involving its members in a cooperative 
act. While prohibitions aim to prevent mimetic cri-
ses from arising in the first place, rituals pursue the 
goal of overcoming such crises by the repetition 
of certain acts intended to foster integration and 
the maintenance of the society (Dieckmann, Wulf, 
Wimmer [1996]; Wulf, Zirfas [2011]; Gil, Wulf 
[2015]).
2. SOCIAL ACTION AND MIMETICALLY 
ACQUIRED PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE
The capacity for social action is acquired 
mimetically in cultural learning processes. This has 
been shown in numerous studies in recent years. 
In mimetic processes people develop skills that 
differ from one culture to another, in games, the 
exchange of gifts and ritual behavior. For people to 
be able to act “correctly” in each situation, practical 
knowledge is necessary. This is acquired in senso-
ry, body-orientated mimetic learning processes in 
each different field of activity. The corresponding 
cultural characteristics of social behavior can also 
only be learned using mimetic approximations. 
Practical knowledge and social activity are shaped 
largely by historical and cultural factors. 
In a first approximation social acts can be 
regarded as mimetic,
• if as movements they relate to other move-
ments;
• if they can be understood as performances or 
enactments of the body;
• if they are independent actions that can be 
understood in their own terms and which 
relate to other actions or worlds (cf. Gebauer, 
Wulf [1998]). 
Thus non-mimetic actions would be, for exam-
ple, mental calculation, decisions, reflex actions 
or routine behavior as well as one-off acts or rule-
breaking. 
The relationship between social action, practi-
cal knowledge and mimetic acquisition of knowl-
edge is demonstrated by the following example 
taken from everyday contemporary culture:
On the morning of her birthday he prepares a glass 
dish decorated with ivy leaves and fills it with water, 
he makes little boats from walnut shells and places a 
candle in each one. Next to the dish there is a birth-
day cake, a large bunch of roses, a bottle of cham-
pagne and the ring, which is packed in a large box, 
to make it more of a surprise. Breakfast is waiting 
on the table that has been elaborately set; his wife 
waits outside the room until he has lit all of the can-
dles and opened the champagne. He takes her in 
his arms, they exchange a few words of affection. A 
woman is about to celebrate her birthday and her 
partner wants to give her a present. He wonders what 
she might like. Initially he does not have many ide-
as. It should not be something useful that she would 
buy herself. He rejects the idea of the fondue set she 
has shown him in a catalogue. This would be more 
a present for them both than a birthday present and 
he finds this a little too impersonal for his partner. 
His thoughts focus on what she would like and what 
would really give her pleasure. He looks through the 
art books in a bookshop and then through the latest 
novels that have just come out, when he remembers 
that last year she gave him an album of photographs 
from the early days of photography, so he decides that 
a book would not be the correct choice. In an antique 
shop he looks for a candlestick or an old lamp. He 
likes what he finds but is still not satisfied. Then he 
sees a garnet ring. He remembers that she once told 
him that her grandmother had such a ring which she 
had loved to try on when she was a little girl. Now he 
is certain that he has found the right present; and she 
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is delighted with the preparations and the present he 
selected so lovingly. They both sit down; they eat and 
have breakfast – taking slightly longer than usual. 
The day begins.
This scene shows us how a man looks for a 
birthday present and, after going to a good deal of 
trouble, finds it, and how he stages and performs 
the giving of the present and the small, early 
morning birthday party. His efforts are success-
ful and bring great joy. Even when searching for 
the present, the man avoids decisions that would 
make the present less meaningful for his wife. He 
selects neither a useful nor a “joint” present; he 
also avoids giving her a similar present to the one 
she had given him recently. After a long search he 
finds something that is particularly suitable for 
his partner and which will appeal to her individu-
ally. His sensitive selection of a present is comple-
mented by the loving preparations of the breakfast 
table with the candles floating amidst the leaves, 
the roses, the champagne, a birthday cake, the 
wrapped present, the elaborately set table, the ten-
der words and the embrace.
How does the man celebrating his wife’s birth-
day know what he has to do to show her his affec-
tion and to turn his efforts into a confirmation of 
the emotional quality of their shared life? Nobody 
has given him a set of rules to follow when cel-
ebrating birthdays or giving presents. Neverthe-
less, the man still has a knowledge of what to 
do and what criteria are important when select-
ing the gift and setting the stage to give it. How 
does the recipient know what the chosen present 
and the early morning celebration arranged in 
such a manner mean and how she is supposed to 
react for the breakfast to become a celebration of 
their togetherness? No one has ever told her what 
the rules are either. However, they both know 
their roles, what they need to do and how they 
should respond to each other so that the morning 
becomes a celebration of their life together.
Such situations are only successful because all 
the participants have a practical knowledge of what 
they need to do, how they should respond to each 
other and how they should present themselves. 
Their actions are derived from practical knowl-
edge of how, when and which situations are to be 
performed and how their performance and staging 
can meet or contradict the expectations of others. 
They have learned this in the many opportunities 
provided by everyday life, where they perceived 
through their own senses the way their parents 
prepared birthday celebrations for them, their sib-
lings or for each other. In these earlier situations 
there may well not have been candles floating 
amidst ivy leaves or thoughts that resulted in the 
purchase of a garnet ring. However, there will have 
been other scenes involving the search for presents 
to delight the recipients, the loving thoughtful atti-
tude towards the birthday celebrant and the joy 
of a shared life. There will have been other birth-
day scenes where, for example, siblings expressed 
their affection in a teasingly aggressive manner, 
where “Happy Birthday” was sung and presents 
were given that had been expressly asked for. In 
spite of such differences, birthday parties resem-
ble each other in a number of aspects. In mimetic 
processes inner pictures, feelings and performative 
sequences arise in the participants, which serve as 
material for them to fashion the scene of the giving 
or receiving of a present or of celebrating or being 
celebrated in similar situations.
Anywhere where someone acts in reference 
to an existing social practice and thereby creates 
a social practice, there is a mimetic relationship 
between the two. This occurs, for instance, when 
one performs a social practice in the example of 
the birthday present, or when one acts accord-
ing to a social model or uses the body to express 
a social concept. As we have seen, this does not 
simply involve actions of imitation. Mimetic 
actions are not mere reproductions that follow a 
pre-existing image precisely. Social practices per-
formed in a mimetic manner lead to the creation 
of something individual.
Unlike the processes of mimicry, which mere-
ly require an adaptation to given conditions, a 
mimetic process – as can be seen in the example 
of the birthday present – creates both similarities 
to and differences from the situations or persons 
to which or whom they relate. In adapting and 
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becoming similar to situations experienced earlier 
and to worlds that bear the mark of the culture 
of which they are part, subjects acquire the skills 
required to behave appropriately in a certain social 
situation. By participating in the living practices 
of other people, they expand their own life-worlds 
and create for themselves new ways of experienc-
ing and acting. Receptivity and activity overlap. In 
this process, the given world becomes interwoven 
with the individual experience of those who form a 
mimetic relationship with it. We recreate the situa-
tions and external worlds experienced earlier, and 
by duplicating them, turn them into our own. It 
is only by confronting earlier situations or exter-
nal worlds that these gain their individuality. It is 
not until this happens that our excess drive loses 
its indeterminate nature and is directed into indi-
vidual wishes and needs. The confronting of the 
external world and the creation of the self occur as 
part of one and the same system. The external and 
internal worlds become increasingly similar and 
can only be experienced in their mutual depend-
ency. Thus the internal and the external take on 
similarities and begin to correspond to each oth-
er. People make themselves similar to the outside 
world and change as they do so; this transforma-
tion involves the changing of their perception of 
the external world and of themselves. 
Mimetic processes lead us to perceive similari-
ties and create links to our social environment and 
it is through experiencing this that people make 
sense of the world. One of the earliest human 
skills was to create similarities, and these can be 
seen clearly in phenomena that correspond in a 
sensory way. Similarities can occur between two 
faces or in processes where one person imitates 
the actions of another. Forms of similarity can 
also be found between the living and the inani-
mate. One of the purposes of the human body is 
to create and express similarities. Dance and lan-
guage illustrate this clearly (Brandstetter, and Wulf 
2007), as here there is no difference between rep-
resentation and expression on the one hand, and 
performance and behavior on the other. They 
form two aspects that are not separate in the act of 
mimesis, but inextricably linked.
The acquisition of practical knowledge in 
mimetic processes does not necessarily involve 
similarities. If mimetic knowledge is acquired by 
relating to social actions or performative behavior 
from the world of the past, then it is only possi-
ble to identify the perspective of the mimetic rela-
tionship by comparing the two worlds. Similar-
ity is nevertheless the most frequent trigger for 
the mimetic impulse. However, creating a magi-
cal contact can also become the initial point of 
mimetic action. A mimetic relationship is even 
necessary to distinguish actions from existing 
social practices, and it is only this that gives us the 
option of accepting, changing or rejecting previ-
ous social actions. 
Previous social actions are carried out for a 
second time in mimetic learning processes. The 
relationship is created not by theoretical thinking 
but aesthetically, through the senses (Michaels, 
Wulf [2014]). The second action differs from the 
first, not by challenging it or altering it but by re-
performing it; thus the mimetic action has both 
a revelatory and a performative character and its 
performance creates its own aesthetic qualities. 
Mimetic processes relate to social worlds already 
created by humankind that are either real or imag-
inary.
The dynamic character of social activities is 
connected with the practical nature of the knowl-
edge required for the enacting of such situations. 
As practical knowledge it is less subject to ration-
al controls than is analytical knowledge. This is 
also because practical, ritual knowledge is not a 
reflexive, self-aware knowledge. It only becomes 
this in the context of conflicts and crises where 
the actions that result from it require justifica-
tion. If social practice is not questioned, practical 
knowledge remains “semi-conscious”. Like habitus 
knowledge it embraces images, schemas and forms 
of activity which are used for the staging and bod-
ily performance of social acts without requiring 
any reflection on their appropriateness. They are 
simply known and called upon for the staging of 
social practices.
Human beings’ residual instinct, the hiatus 
between stimulus and response and also their 
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“eccentricity” (Plessner [1982]) are prerequisites 
for the extraordinary plasticity of humankind 
and the opportunities this provides for acquiring 
practical knowledge in mimetic processes, there-
by allowing social action to be conceptualized, 
staged and performed. This practical knowledge 
also includes the body movements that are used to 
stage scenes of social action. Discipline and con-
trol of body movements result in a disciplined and 
controlled practical knowledge which is stored in 
the body memory and enables human beings to 
enact the corresponding forms of symbolic and 
scenic actions. This practical knowledge is based 
on the social forms of action and performance 
established in a particular culture, and is therefore 
a pronounced but specific knowledge, limited in 
terms of its historical and cultural horizons.
Imitative change and adaptation of previous 
worlds take place in mimetic processes (Hüp-
pauf, Wulf [2009]). This is the innovative factor of 
mimetic actions.  Social practices are mimetic if 
they relate to other actions and can themselves be 
seen as social arrangements that constitute inde-
pendent social practices and also relate to other 
practices. Social actions are made possible by the 
acquisition of practical knowledge in the course 
of mimetic processes. The practical knowledge 
necessary for social actions is not only historical 
and cultural but also body and ludic knowledge; 
it is formed in face-to-face situations and is not 
semantically unequivocal; it has aesthetic compo-
nents and elements of the imaginary and cannot 
be reduced to intentionality, it incorporates an 
excess of meaning and can be seen in the social 
stagings and performances of religion, politics 
and everyday life (Kraus, Budde, Hietzge, Wulf 
[2017]).
3. MIMETIC EMBODIMENT IN RITUALS
In all areas of human existence rituals and ges-
tures are important for the mimetic development 
of body knowledge Embodied ritual knowledge is 
indispensable in religion, politics, economy, sci-
ence, families, and education. It helps us to deal 
with difference and alterity and to create a sense 
of community and social relationship. It also ena-
bles us to assign meaning and structure to human 
relations. Ritual knowledge facilitates both conti-
nuity and change, as well as experiences of tran-
sition and transcendence.  Given the significance 
of rituals in so many areas of social life, it is no 
surprise that there is no generally accepted theory 
of rituals, since the positions of the individual aca-
demic disciplines differ too widely. Scholars now 
generally agree that it makes little sense to reduce 
the wealth and diversity of studies on rituals to 
individual theories and lines of research. What is 
needed is rather to be aware of a wide variety of 
aspects and to render the complexity of the field 
explicit (Wulf et al. [2001], [2004], [2007], [2010], 
[2011]).
All approaches to classifying rituals are faced 
with the fact that rituals are always the product 
of multidimensional processes of symbolization 
and construction. The phenomena studied are 
also more complex than the concepts and theo-
ries used to describe them. This also applies to the 
attempt to organize the field of ritual studies by 
types of occasion and to distinguish, for instance, 
the following kinds of rituals: 
• Rituals of transition (birth and childhood, ini-
tiation and adolescence, marriage, death)
• Rituals of institution or taking up office (tak-
ing on new tasks and positions)
• Seasonal rituals (Christmas, birthdays, days of 
remembrance, national holidays)
• Rituals of intensification (eating, celebrating, 
love, sexuality)
• Rituals of rebellion (peace and ecological 
movements, rituals of youth)
• Rituals of interaction (greetings, taking leave, 
conflicts) (Gebauer, Wulf [1998]: 130).
Other attempts at classification are also con-
ceivable and can provide orientation in the com-
plex field of ritual research. It is possible to differ-
entiate between the following types of ritual activ-
ity: ritualization, convention, ceremony, liturgy, cel-
ebration (Grimes [1985]).  
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In all rituals mimetic processes contribute to 
the development of practical knowledge. When 
we look at the staging and performance of ritu-
als, the bodies of the participants are implicitly 
involved. How do these appear in a ritual? How 
are they enacted? What does their arrangement in 
the ritual tell us about the community, the indi-
viduals, and their culture? The movements and 
practices of bodies need to be considered.  How 
are they used to exploit the ritual space, and what 
rhythm do they follow? The distance between 
bodies and the manner in which they approach 
each other and distance themselves are signifi-
cant. What positions do they take up? Do they 
stand or sit? What movements do they make 
when they dance? The configurations of the body 
are symbolically encoded and convey messages. 
In terms of gestures, which we can consider to 
be language without words, it is possible to dis-
tinguish between iconic and symbolic gestures. 
Iconic gestures are simple “pictorial” gestures 
with meanings that are largely independent of the 
knowledge of a historical time or a particular cul-
ture. Examples of such gestures are giving indica-
tions of dimensions with simple hand movements 
or expressing tiredness and the need for sleep by 
inclining the head and placing the hands together 
beside it. Symbolic gestures, on the other hand, 
have different meanings depending on the his-
torical era or culture, and more precise histori-
cal and cultural knowledge is required to under-
stand them (Wulf, Fischer-Lichte [2010]). In all 
cases, the “logic” of the body, that is, its presen-
tation and expression, plays an important role in 
the performance of gestures and rituals. This is 
especially true of the preconscious perception of 
bodily expressions, which forms the basis upon 
which the atmosphere of ritual arrangements is 
felt. The bodies of other people look at us before 
we become consciously aware of them, and in 
this way they determine our perception of them. 
In order for the performance of rituals to result 
in embodiment-processes, people need to expe-
rience the flow of energies and forces between 
them as a physical and psychological process that 
takes place at the outer reaches of consciousness.
During the staging and performance of ritu-
als, a new social reality is created and incorpo-
rated by the pas (Wulf, Zirfas [2007]). This reality 
is not completely new, since previous versions of 
it have existed before; however, it has not existed 
in this particular form at this particular location 
before this particular time. Drawing on earlier rit-
uals, every staging and performance creates a new 
ritual reality and a new ritual community. This 
ritual community can develop for the first time 
among the people who carry out the ritual actions, 
but it can also be experienced as a repetition 
through which the community confirms its status 
as such. The performance of rituals is decisive for 
the forming of the members of communities. The 
community presents itself in the staging and style 
of the performance. In the ritual presentation it 
expresses something that cannot be portrayed in 
any other way. The ritual staging can therefore be 
seen as a “window” that provides a glimpse into 
the deep structure of the community and the cul-
ture that creates it. The staging and performing of 
rituals renders something visible that was previ-
ously invisible and embody it in the participants 
of the ritual. The staging of rituals always includes 
a reference to previous ritual performances. How-
ever, this can vary greatly. In some cases the con-
nection between old and new ritual performances 
is very close; in others it is very loose. However, 
in both cases the performance and incorporation 
of the ritual establishes a form of continuity that 
is important for the effectiveness of the ritual. 
Often, the historical continuity is incorporated 
in the participants of the ritual and stabilizes the 
social order of the community and legitimizes it. 
This frequently serves to uphold the current distri-
bution of power and maintain bodily based social 
hierarchies and requires a critical analysis of the 
power relations.
Rituals are tied to time and space, and their 
cultural and historical conditions are embodied in 
these terms. Different spaces have differing effects 
on the structure, quality, and style of the ritu-
als that take place within them. Ritual spaces dif-
fer from physical spaces. On the one hand, they 
create ritual stagings and performances; on the 
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other hand, rituals create ritual spaces using body 
movements, settings, and symbolic and indexical 
frames. Rituals and space are not related in terms 
of subject/object or cause and effect, but interac-
tively. Both rituals and spaces are performative 
(Wulf, Göhlich, Zirfas [2001]). On the one hand, 
a decorated gymnasium provides the space for a 
school dance, just as a church provides the space 
for a confirmation ceremony. On the other hand, 
the school dance transforms the gymnasium into 
a ballroom, and the confirmation ceremony trans-
forms the church into a living, sacred space. The 
intermeshing of real, virtual, symbolic, and imagi-
nary spaces with the bodily movements of those 
taking part plays an important role in the develop-
ment of ritual activities.
This intermeshing of real, virtual, symbolic, 
and imaginary spaces with bodily movements 
takes place in an environment shaped by his-
torical and cultural factors (Wulf [2007], [2013a], 
[2013b]; Renger, Wulf [2016]). This results in an 
atmosphere that affects the mood of all the partici-
pants in the ritual. Actions that have already been 
carried out here before and for which the space is 
suitable are repeated as part of an attempt to adjust 
to the atmosphere, structure, and function of the 
space in which the ritual is being carried out. The 
participants change by mimetically recreating the 
conditions of the space around them. The per-
formative effects and embodiment of ritual spaces 
such as the church, the family living room, and the 
virtual space of electronic media are very different 
from one another and have different socializing 
effects (Kontopodis, Vanvantakis, Wulf [2017]).
The other constituent condition of ritual activ-
ity apart from space is time. Two complementary 
views are important for the manner in which 
humans deal with time. First, rituals play a major 
role in introducing children to the time structure 
of society. Parents attempt to adjust their chil-
dren’s rhythms to the time rhythms of society and 
thus to accustom even infants to the manner of 
structuring time that is the social norm. Child-
hood rituals are used to ensure that time becomes 
the main structuring influence in children’s lives. 
Second, in our ritualized handling of time, we 
acquire practical knowledge that is indispensable 
for the staging and performance of rituals. Insofar 
as the management of time results from cultural 
learning processes, rituals play a very important 
part in this. Their repetitive character helps to 
inscribe the order of time into our bodies, which 
then become structured by time. Many rituals are 
repeated cyclically. Their purpose is to assure us of 
the presence of the community and to reaffirm its 
order and potential for transformation. The aim 
of rituals is to stage continuity, timelessness, and 
constancy. They are oriented toward processual-
ity and the projectivity of communities and indi-
viduals. As we structure our time in a ritualized 
manner, we learn to manage it as a social skill. 
In today’s societies the ritual organization of time 
lends a structure to every aspect of individual and 
communal life.
Between the beginning and the end of a ritu-
al, different sequences of ritual activity occur in 
which different kinds of actions are expected and 
carried out. The rule-bound nature of ritual activ-
ity is closely linked to its sequentiality. The ritual 
actions follow an order that is also chronologi-
cal and embodied. Periods of time are created in 
and by means of rituals that differ from the uni-
formity of everyday life and become moments of 
heightened intensity. This kind of intensification 
is due to the exceptional character of the events 
and is also achieved by highly condensing them 
and speeding them up. In many rituals, time 
becomes sacred time. Memory and reconnection 
with the past are therefore constitutive elements 
of religions, which, with the aid of rituals, trans-
fer sacred content from communicative memory 
to cultural memory. They thereby render it acces-
sible, so that it can be used to shape the future. In 
the experience of sacred time, it is not so much 
the length of time that counts as its intensity. On 
the one hand, rites of passage make it possible to 
experience different stages of life as phases with 
their own temporal dynamics;  on the other, they 
create continuity and meaning in the process of 
life. In the time structures of rituals, different 
times often overlap, resulting in highly complex 
experiences of time.
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Rituals are essential for worship and the 
embodiment of religion, regardless of whether one 
sees their importance in the creation and practicing 
of religious feelings in cult ceremonies or focuses 
on their capacity to create sacrality, in which soci-
ety makes an image of itself. The magical character 
of ceremonies of promotion to a higher office also 
has many aspects in common with sacred ceremo-
nies.  Even a candlelit dinner for two, where the 
candles on the table emphasize the special atmos-
phere of sharing a meal, raises the question as to 
whether the scene has elements borrowed from 
the sphere of the sacred and transferred to every-
day life. The upgrading of such customs by adding 
sacred symbols may be connected to the far-reach-
ing changes in attitudes toward religion and sacred 
matters that we are currently experiencing. 
During the performance of rituals, the par-
ticipants refer simultaneously and directly to the 
actions of other participants. They do so largely 
by means of mimesis, using the senses, the move-
ments of the body, and a joint orientation toward 
words, sounds, language, and music. A ritual can 
only take place as a structured whole if all actions 
are successfully coordinated, precisely orchestrat-
ed and adequately embodied. Here the staging is 
indispensable; however, the performance itself is 
the decisive factor, as the ritual actions need to be 
exactly coordinated. Otherwise the results are far-
cical, and the ritual breaks down. If the interaction 
is to be harmonious, the ritual activities must be 
mimetically coordinated with each other. If this is 
achieved, energies can “flow” between the ritual 
participants, and this is experienced as intense, 
pleasant, and bonding (Csikszentmihalyi [1990]). 
As in dance or courtship behavior, the rational 
control of actions also has limits in rituals. We 
only have the feeling that a ritual is successful if 
a mimetically created harmony that is beyond 
rational control develops between one body and 
another, one movement and another, and one ges-
ture and another. These mimetic processes form 
the basis of the feeling of belonging to a commu-
nity as well as the experience of the sacred. 
Whereas the synchronous dimension of 
mimetic processes relates to the importance of 
mimetic processes in the actual conduct of ritu-
als, the diachronous dimension relates to the his-
torical aspects of rituals. Rituals always relate to 
others that have taken place before - either ones 
in which one has participated or ones of which 
one has heard. Thus the historical dimension is 
essential for the creation and the incorporation 
of rituals. Ritual actions include mimetic refer-
ences to earlier rituals. As these references are 
made by mimesis, they create an “impression” of 
earlier performances of the ritual, which is then 
adapted to suit the current context. Depend-
ing on the requirements, some aspects of the 
ritual may be transformed in this process. Cre-
ating a mimetic link between the current world 
and a previous world ensures historical continu-
ity, which legitimizes the current ritual activity, 
even if it differs from its predecessor. This use of 
mimesis to refer to or reconnect with previous 
performances of a ritual does not mean that it is 
recreated in exactly the same way every time. To 
make a reference by mimesis is to “adjust one-
self to become similar”, that is, to repeat a similar 
action that would not be possible if the previous 
ritual activity had not taken place. In some cases 
the result of this mimetic referencing also leads 
to a critical distancing from the reference point 
of the ritual, although this point of reference 
does not become superfluous. In mimetic refer-
encing processes, the configurations and arrange-
ments of the ritual action are updated and modi-
fied to match the context of our own activities. 
Mimetic constellations, staging styles, and types 
of movement are acquired and modified accord-
ing to necessity or what the person thinks fit. The 
“repetition” of earlier rituals does not result in a 
copy of a ritual in the sense of a copy as made 
by a photocopier. Rather, through the inclusion 
of mimetically transferred and assimilated ele-
ments, something new is created in the repeti-
tion for everyone involved. The older version is 
merged into the new in a dialectical fashion. 
The ritual that has been updated by this mimetic 
process contains the old ritual, which has been 
given a new face and new clothing (Wulf [2005]; 
Michaels, Wulf [2013]).
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Mimetic processes play an important role in 
the staging, performing and incorporation of rit-
ual events: they produce the practical knowledge 
necessary for the ritual actions in question.  This 
ritual knowledge, which enables us to act compe-
tently in rituals, evolves from real or imaginary 
participation in ritual activities. In mimetic pro-
cesses people take part in ritual actions that are 
corporeal and are both independent and related 
to other ritual acts or arrangements. In so doing, 
they undergo an expansion in order to accom-
modate the ritual practice. Thus, through mimetic 
referencing, they undergo a process of adjusting 
to the ritual activities in which corporeality and 
performativity play an important role. These pro-
cesses incorporate ritual configurations, scenes, 
sequences of events, images, and behavior pat-
terns, all of which, in other contexts, contribute to 
the competent execution of a ritual practice.
4. OUTLOOK
Mimetic processes are principally but not 
exclusively orientated towards other people. In 
mimetic processes they also incorporate their cul-
tural environments. In the course of these process-
es, children assimilate aspects of their home, such 
as rooms, particular corners, objects and atmos-
pheres. People and objects of the environment 
are incorporated as “imprints” and stored in the 
body and in the imaginary world, where they are 
subsequently transformed into new images and 
memories that help gain access to people and cul-
ture. Culture is handed on by means of these pro-
cesses of incorporating and making sense of peo-
ple and cultural products. The mimetic ability to 
transform people and the external material world 
into images, transferring them into the internal 
worlds of images and making them accessible to 
others enables individuals to actively handle the 
relationship with other people and shape cultural 
realities. These processes encompass our modes of 
dealing with the material products of culture and 
with the social relationships and forms of activity 
and the way social life is staged and performed. In 
particular this involves forms of practical knowl-
edge that are learned mimetically in body-orient-
ed, sensory processes and enable us to act com-
petently in institutions and organizations. Ritual 
knowledge, for example, is an important area of 
this practical social knowledge, and this is the 
means by which “imprints” of people and institu-
tions become rooted in the human body, enabling 
us to orient ourselves and act in social situations. 
Images, schemas and movements are learned and 
embodied in mimetic processes, and these render 
the individual capable of action. Since mimetic 
processes involve other human beings and prod-
ucts of history and culture, scenes, arrangements 
and performances, these processes are among the 
most important ways of handing down culture 
from one generation to the next.
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